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This paper develops a theory of consumer boycotts. Some consumers care not only about the 
products they buy but also about whether the firm behaves ethically. Other consumers do not 
care about the behavior of the firm but yet may like to give the impression of being ethical 
consumers. Consequently, to affect a firm’s ethical behavior, moral consumers refuse to buy 
from an unethical firm. Consumers who do not care about ethical behavior may join the 
boycott to (falsely) signal that they do care. In the firm’s choice between ethical and unethical 
behavior, the optimality of mixed and pure strategies depends on the cost of behaving 
ethically. In particular, when the cost is (relatively) low, ethical behavior arises from a 
prisoners’ dilemma as the firm’s optimal strategy. 
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A ￿rm deviating from an accepted social norm like environmental protection,
sound personnel policy, or avoidance of child labor, may risk punishment by
consumers. Examples of such punishments are many. Shell Oil su⁄ered damage
to its image from the military action of the Nigerian government against domes-
tic protests aimed at protecting the delta of its river. Nestle su⁄ered from lost
reputation after selling inappropriate milk to pregnant mothers in developing
countries. In 2005, an Estonian ship was caught releasing waste into the Baltic
Sea. After the passengers￿initiative to boycott the owner, it quickly announced
a policy change, pledging to safely release waste into containers. The plan of
the ￿rm producing the British condiment HP sauce to move production to the
Netherlands caused a consumer boycott in Britain. While these examples may
suggest that a consumer boycott is a tool used to empower the disadvantaged,
it is important to highlight that consumer boycotts can also be used to pursue
con￿ icting ethical aims. During the apartheid regimes, Rhodesia and South
Africa were boycotted by the opponents of racism. In Nazi Germany, consumer
boycotts were used to persecute Jews. During the recent row about Danish
cartoons that some Muslims found o⁄ensive, the Danish ￿rm Arla was ￿rst
boycotted in several Islamic countries, which then triggered a counter boycott
among those western consumers regarding the initial boycott as unfair.
A person who joins a consumer boycott is typically willing to pay a higher
price for a good produced by a ￿rm not boycotted. Moreover, those organizing
the boycott often want to see other consumers join. The internet and other
modern means of communication provide consumers with new instruments to
in￿ uence the ethical behavior of other producers (Andersen, 1999).1 The con-
sumers￿concerns may induce a ￿rm to devote attention to its image.2 Indeed,
the internet home pages of many ￿rms describe their work in helping develop-
ment projects and controlling environmental damage.3
Our paper analyzes a model in which competing ￿rms produce identical
products but can choose their corporate ethics, di⁄erentiating their image among
consumers. Consumers observe the behavior of ￿rms. Moral consumers avoid
buying from a ￿rm which violated some ethical position. We ask when amoral
consumers join a boycott initiated by the moral ones. They may join a boycott
because of the private bene￿t of pretending to have a moral stance. We ask
1John, Klein and Smith (2002) and Klein, Smith and John (2004) explore the motivations
for consumer boycotts.
2Consumers￿in￿uence can be thought to be the greatest in industries where products are
not too di⁄erentiated and where competition is severe. Those features can be expected to
be measured by price elasticities. Elastic demand points to high substitutability and a low
switching cost. Research supports the proposition that consumers can in￿uence ￿rms, see
Morales (2005). Cronberg (1986) analyzes consumers￿in￿uence on new technology. Reasons
for why boycotts arise are studied by Klein, Mith, and John (2004). Information on how
consumers react to other matters than the price￿ a ￿rm￿ s image￿ can apparently be based
on case studies only. Stock prices and consumer prices can there be helpful indicators.
3Switching costs, which may especially appear when transaction costs make consumers
commit to some products, are analyzed by Klemperer (1995). See also Antheon, Camarero
and Carrero (2007).
1how ￿rms behave under the threat of a boycott. We examine in particular
whether a boycott can e⁄ectively direct corporate ethics and how competition
determines the market outcome.4 The existing literature is meager. Some
papers study corporate ethics, but only a few study consumers￿actions. Baron
(2002) analyzes individuals deciding when and how much to boycott the ￿rm.
The action reveals information which represents a public good. Innes (2006)
examines strategic interactions between non-identical duopolistic ￿rms and an
environmental organization. There are several di⁄erences when compared with
our paper. In our paper, consumers are heterogeneous and the game is between
the rival ￿rms, not between the ￿rms and the environmental organization. In
Innes (2006), the combined sales by the two ￿rms are constant. In our model
instead, the sales are endogenous. If both ￿rms pollute the moral consumers do
not buy from either in our model. In Innes (2006), only one of the ￿rms may be
subject of a boycott.5 In our paper, the e¢ ciency of a boycott is determined by
the moral reaction of consumers and the cost imposed on consumers who do not
join the boycott. For concreteness, we shall say that a ￿rm behaves ethically
if and only if it makes an investment which reduces its pro￿ts but is valued
by moral consumers and hence attracts customers. What makes the problem
non-trivial is the joint consideration of consumer and ￿rm behavior.
Section 2 of the paper introduces the ethical preferences of consumers and
the ￿rms￿strategies. Section 3 analyzes the market equilibrium when the ￿rms￿
ethical codes di⁄er. Section 4 considers the optimal pure strategies; Section 5
considers mixed strategies. Section 6 shows that the ethical behavior of ￿rms
may arise from a prisoners￿dilemma. Section 7 concludes.
2 Assumptions
2.1 Firms
We cast the analysis in terms of a duopoly market where two ￿rms compete for
customers. The products (or services) are physically identical but the produc-
tion processes can di⁄er; we can say that production is polluting or not.
There are two periods. In period 1, each ￿rm decides on whether to pollute;
it invests or not say, in pollution abatement. The cost of abatement can di⁄er
across ￿rms. We consider the cases where mixed strategies or alternatively
pure strategies are optimal. In period 2, each ￿rm￿ s pollution becomes common
knowledge, and each consumer decides at which ￿rm to buy.
4A ￿rm can respond to a boycott by playing tough or weak, depending on how much
it values a good image. Corporate social responsibility, CSR, has grown to a highly debated
issue, initiated long time ago by Friedman (1970) who defended the pro￿t maximization target.
The strategy of a ￿rm may result in a particular reputation and may in￿uence the success or
failure of a future boycott. We ignore such reputation building in the current paper.
5Kanniainen and Pietarila (2006) analyze consumers￿ in￿uence on the ethical choice of
￿rms but abstract from boycotts.
22.2 Ethical preferences of consumers
People di⁄er in their attitudes to pollution, and some may ￿nd it valuable to
misrepresent their hidden preferences. There are two types of consumers. An
a-type has moral preferences; a b-type does not.6 The mass of a-type consumers
is n; the mass of b-type consumers is scaled to 1.7 Each consumer buys at most
one unit of the good. In the two groups, consumers are indexed in decreasing
order on i￿[0;n] and j￿[0;1] with respect to their basic willingness to pay for
the product. Consumers i = 0 and j = 0 have the highest basic willingness to
pay for the product, say ￿ in each group; consumers i = n and j = 1 have zero
willingness to pay for it. The willingness to pay by the remaining consumers
is uniformly distributed on (0;￿) in both groups. To illustrate, and ignoring
moral and reputational e⁄ects for the moment, the utility from consumption by
consumers, say k and l; are given by indirect utility functions uk = ￿(n￿k)￿p
and uk = ￿(1 ￿ k) ￿ p where p is the market price.
The products become di⁄erentiated if one ￿rm pollutes while the other does
not. In the social context, inviduals may view it important to be considered
moral so as to avoid exclusion from particular social groups, loss of friendship,
and even barriers in the marriage market. We let b > 0 denote the cost imposed
on a consumer who does not join the boycott. This can be thought of as a social
pressure, commonly observed.
3 Equilibrium with di⁄ering pure strategies
We shall consider three di⁄erent combinations of investment in abatement: no
￿rm invests, both ￿rms invest, or only one does. As we eventually have to
determine the outcome of the investment game under various strategies, it is
most illuminating to start with the case of two pure strategies. In this section
therefore, we consider the case where one of the ￿rms invests, thereby incurring a
￿xed cost c, while the other does not invest. Occasionally we allow for di⁄erences
in the costs for reasons which will become clear. In the market, the products
of the ￿rms, though perfect substitutes in consumption, di⁄er with di⁄erent
images of their producers. Some consumers will then switch from buying the
product of the ￿rm which pollutes, say L, to buying from the ￿rm which does
not pollute, say H. More speci￿cally, the boycotting high-moral consumers
abstain from buying at ￿rm L and buy only at ￿rm H. Since in equilibrium
not all may buy, we denote the number of active high-moral buyers by xh. The
number of low-moral consumers who stay at ￿rm L is denoted by xl: Some of
the low types, however, switch to the H ￿rm in order to (falsely) signal high
6The origin of ethical preference lies beyond our scope. A natural source is that the
preferences are created by evolutionary mechanisms among human beings becoming integrated
into a social contract, cf. Binmore (1998). It is appropriate to think that the ability to
commit to a social norm and the option to participate in a boycott develop like a social meme
introduced by Dawkins (1976) and elaborated by Blackmore (1999).
7The population hence consists of a mixture of individuals of homo moralis and homo
oeconomicus types.
3morality. Their number is denoted by xm.
Equilibrium We denote the resulting price at the ethical ￿rm by pH and the
price at the non-ethical ￿rm by pL. The resulting market equilibrium has the
following structure. From the de￿nition of the marginal moral consumer xh, we




) = pH:8 (1)
We can of course have a market equilibrium where no low-moral consumer
switches to ￿rm H. However, to make the analysis interesting, we assume that
the bene￿t from signalling is su¢ cient so that some, i.e. xm; do. The marginal
low-moral consumer must be indi⁄erent between the two markets. Thus, prices
must satisfy
￿(1 ￿ xm) ￿ pH = ￿(1 ￿ xm) ￿ b ￿ pL; (2)
where, to recall, b is the social pressure when a consumer buys at ￿rm L. There-
fore,
Lemma 1. The price di⁄erence arises from the cost of social pressure,
pH ￿ pL = b:9 (3)
The marginal low-moral consumer (with an index j = xm+xl) is indi⁄erent
between buying at ￿rm L or buying nothing. Thus, his net utility is
￿(1 ￿ xm ￿ xl) ￿ b = pL: (4)
In the Cournot model, ￿rms decide on their outputs allowing the prices to
adjust.10 Denote the outputs of the two ￿rms by yH and yL: Then,
yH = xh + xm; yL = xl: (5)
Thus, the number of active moral buyers is xh = yH ￿ xm: To solve for the







) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ xm ￿ xl) + b = b:





8Therefore, not all moral consumers buy. They all buy only if xh = n, making pH = 0:
Otherwise, xh < n:
9We notice that all low-moral types are indi⁄erent between the two markets as the social
cost of pressure just matches the price di⁄erence. Each ￿rm chooses its output knowing the
consumers￿behavior.
10The behavior of ￿rms in duopolistic markets has been subject to some debate, cf. Kreps
and Sheinkman (1983). G￿th (1993) shows how quantity competition can be justi￿ed without
the complexities discussed by the earlier literature.
4Then, the pro￿ts are
￿H = yHpH ￿ c
= yH(￿ ￿ ￿
yH + yL
1 + n
) ￿ c (7)
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We then obtain the solutions for the outputs:


















(1 + n)(￿ + b)
3￿
:
The non-polluting ￿rm bene￿ts from the incentive of the less moral con-
sumers who mimic the moral ones. Similarly, social pressure on the amoral
consumers bene￿ts this ￿rm while the unethical ￿rm su⁄ers from a loss of cus-
tomers.
Noticing that the signalling bene￿t or the social pressure may di⁄er between
products, we state
Corollary 1. The economic e⁄ect of a boycott is small when the boycott is
directed at products which are less useful for signalling reasons, that is, where
the social punishment is low.











Lemma 2 The number of mimicking customers is determined by the sig-
nalling bene￿t￿ the cost of social pressure￿ relative to the basic willingness to
pay by the consumers.
Thus, a consumer boycott by moral (non-opportunistic) people induces some
opportunistic amoral people to take advantage of the signalling bene￿t, making
the consumer market in the aggregate behave more morally. The smaller is the
cost of social pressure relative to the basic willingness to pay, the less e⁄ective
is the boycott.
We next solve for the prices, starting those faced by the non-moral con-
sumers:


















can be calculate as
￿HL
H = pHyH ￿ c
=










4.1 Equilibrium with mixed strategies
To examine the conditions for an equilibrium with mixed strategies, call the
￿rms A and B. Assume that the investment is not observable when undertaken
but that in the production stage, consumers observe whether a ￿rm pollutes.
6Now, the ￿rms can for competitive reasons randomize their investments and we
start by studying the mixed strategy equilibrium. We then work out whether
and when a pure strategy￿ and which one￿ can arise in equilibrium.




A + (1 ￿ qB)￿HL
A
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The expected pro￿ts are linear in the probabilities. A (mixed) Nash equi-






























































These conditions represent a Nash equilibrium without a dominating strat-





















Therefore, before we can address these conditions, we need to study the pure
strategies to ￿nd out the pro￿t levels.
4.2 When both ￿rms choose the same pure strategy
In this section, we allow for the costs of investment, cA;cB; to di⁄er.
4.2.1 Neither ￿rm invests
It is also possible that one strategy dominates for both ￿rms. When it is optimal
to choose qA = qB = 0; not investing represents the dominant strategy. Now
7one group of customers - boycotters - leaves the market, i.e. the total market
size is squeezed to 1, there is one price and the ￿rms share the customers on an
equal basis.
The pro￿ts are then
￿LL
A = pAyL; ￿LL
B = pByL:






To solve, the marginal customer has zero utility
￿(1 ￿ yA ￿ yB) ￿ b ￿ pL = 0:
Pro￿ts are
￿A = [￿(1 ￿ yA ￿ yB) ￿ b]yA
￿B = [￿(1 ￿ yA ￿ yB) ￿ b]yB:




























4.2.2 Both ￿rms invest
When it is optimal to choose qA = qB = 1; investing is the dominant strategy.
Pro￿ts are then
￿HH
A = pHqH ￿ cA; ￿HH
B = pHqH ￿ cB:
For completeness, we allowed for di⁄erent costs. The outcome is a symmetric
Cournot equilibrium. This equilibrium can arise if the cost saving ci is small







11These conditions are not, however, su¢ cient, as a prisoners￿dilemma to be studied be-
low arises under these same conditions (strengthened by some others) with qA = qB = 1
representing the dominating strategy.
12We show below that this is not the only case where investing is the optimal strategy. It
can arise as a prisoners￿dilemma.
8To solve for the market shares, we notice ￿rst that the total mass of potential
customers in the market in this case is 1 + n and the two ￿rms share these
customers. The ￿rms now face a less steep market demand as the mass of
potential customers is increased. Denoting the total amount of buying customers
by xHH, it must hold that the last buyer is indi⁄erent between buying and not





) = pH: (19)
As the market is shared, we have that
xHH = xA + xB:
The pro￿ts are
￿HH














Then, when both ￿rms invest, the equilbrium pro￿ts are
￿HH












￿ ci; i = A;B: (21)
5 When does the equilibrium have mixed strate-
gies?
It is helpful ￿rst to collect the above ￿ndings under pure strategies, with c
pointing to the cost of the investing ￿rm,
￿HL
H =









































A > 0 & ￿HL
A ￿ ￿LL
A < 0:
It now becomes important to exlicitly di⁄erentiate the investment costs. Eval-












(1 + n)4b(￿ ￿ b)
9￿
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(1 + n)4b(￿ ￿ b)
9￿
:
This can never hold, because for any reasonable parameter values the value
of the left-hand side exceeds the value of the right-hand side.




A < 0 & ￿HL
A ￿ ￿LL
A > 0
These conditions amount to stating
(1 + n)2￿
2 ￿ ((￿ ￿ 2b)(1 + n))2
9(1 + n)￿
< cA <









Proposition 2. The necessary and su¢ cient condition for a mixed strategy
as an optimal choice for ￿rm B is that the cost of investment of its rival, ￿rm
A; satis￿es the above conditions (22).














As the mixed strategies do not always exits in equilibrium, it makes sense
to further study the pure strategies i.e. when cA does not satisfy any of the
above two conditions.
Pure strategies in the limit Consider the optimal strategies when cA ap-


























= 0: Linking with the expression for qB;we have
lim
c!c
qB = 1; lim
c!c
qB = 0: (23)
Similarly for qA:
We conclude that the ￿rms do not always choose to play a mixed strategy.
For the equilibrium to have mixed strategies, it is necessary that the conditions
(22) are satis￿ed. These conditions link the value of consumer signalling with
the ￿rms￿cost of being ethical. Ethical behavior may arise as a pure strategy but
only if the cost of investment falls within an intermediate region. It cannot be
too high but neither can it be too low. We turn now to focus on that possibility.
6 Ethical behavior as a prisoners￿dilemma: low
pro￿t equilibrium.
An argument developed by Shleifer (2004) suggests that competition is detri-
mental to corporate ethics. Our analysis challenges his view. We arrive at this
view by examining whether there exists a combination of pure strategies which
11satis￿es the conditions for the prisoners￿dilemma. This amounts to claiming
that, in the absence of commitment, a low-pro￿t equilibrium with both ￿rms
investing replaces a joint pro￿t maximization where neither invests. Both ￿rms
would indeed generate more pro￿ts by not investing. However, in the face of
a rival investing, it becomes optimal to follow the lead. In the current model,
such a harsh requirement appears reasonable as otherwise the ￿rms lose all the
boycotting customers.
Intuitively, the equilibrium depicting a prisoners￿dilemma can be character-












A indicates that if A invests it can increase its pro￿t
subject to the condition that B does not invest. The condition ￿HL
B < ￿LL
B
indicates that in such a case B will lose a lot.
In terms of the optimal strategies, the strategy pair HH arising as a prison-
ers￿dilemma requires that qA = qB = 1: That is, it should be optimal to have























Given that the incentive to deviate from the LL￿outcome exists for both
￿rms, ￿HL
A > ￿LL
A ; the right-hand side is positive. It is then su¢ cient for this
inequality to hold that ￿￿HH
A + ￿LH




representing one of the characterizations of the prisoners￿dilemma. We now
examine what conditions are required for the equilibrium to be characterized as
prisoners￿dilemma given the structure of our model.
First, when a ￿rm, say A switches individually from the strategy pair LL to
HL while the other ￿rm plays L; the pro￿t of ￿rm A increases,








Second, the pro￿t of the ￿rm, say B is reduced if it does not follow, that is

















; i = A;B:





Multiplying the condition (26) by (1 + n);
((￿ ￿ 2b)(1 + n))2 < (￿ ￿ b)2(1 + n)





















; i = A;B: (27)
It remains to give a numerical example as to when these conditions can hold.
Take ￿ = 1: Moreover, it makes sense to examine the limiting case n ! 0. The
lower limit for ci then becomes
1
9
b(2 ￿ b) < ci:
For example, having then b = 0:25; one obtains
0:0486 < ci:












With b = 0:25; one has
ci < min(0:11;0:11)
= 0:11:
Thus, when the investment satis￿es
0:0486 < ci < 0:11;
the HH strategy pair may arise as a prisoners￿dilemma, provided that it is not
optimal to play a mixed strategy studied earlier. From there we know that a
mixed strategy cannot arise in equilibrium if
ci <
(1 + n)2￿
2 ￿ ((￿ ￿ 2b)(1 + n))2
9(1 + n)￿
:
With the numerical values above, this condition is
ci <
1 ￿ ((1 ￿ 0:5))2
9
= 0:083:
13Indeed, when 0:0486 < ci < 0:083; the equilibrium arises as a prisoners￿
dilemma. This conclusion was strictly obtained by having the number of moral
consumers in the market n = 0: By continuity, it must hold also when n is
positive but su¢ ciently small. We can state the conclusion as a proposition:
Proposition 3: When the number of moral consumers is small and when
the investment cost is small but strictly positive, ￿rms may invest in abatement
even if their pro￿ts are reduced. The equilibrium then arises from a prisoners￿
dilemma.
Were ci < 0:0486; the HH equilibrium would arise as a dominating pure
strategy not as a prisoners￿dilemma. For completeness, it is worth stating that
when the investment cost ci is high, say ci > c; the LL becomes the dominating
strategy.
7 Final remarks
Modern communication media, including the internet, enhance the opportuni-
ties for consumers to in￿ uence the ethical behavior of producers. This increased
in￿ uence has induced ￿rms to devote substantial e⁄ort to build a favorable im-
age among consumers. Consumer power apparently has been increasing and
will continue to increase though we only have indirect evidence on that. Firms
often highlight their contributions to economic development or to environmental
quality. Consequently, with increasing concern about environmental issues like
the greenhouse e⁄ect, one can expect that we will see an increased incentive for
individuals to organize boycotts in the future. In the end, there may be fewer,
however, if such a threat leads ￿rms to behave better.
Do markets produce the right amount of boycotts? Are there too few boy-
cotts from the social point of view? This is a challenging welfare issue. In
an individualistic society with utilitarian preferences, the well-being of (all)
citizens are often taken as the starting point for the evaluation of the social
welfare. Boycotts enhance the market position of well-behaving ￿rms and the
consumer surplus of their customers. There are, however, quite a few other wel-
fare aspects. The negative externalities, say pollution, is reduced - we have not
modelled such an externality explicitly. The moral individuals who abstain from
buying from the unethical ￿rm do bene￿t, though we abstracted from introduc-
ing this mechanism in our formal model if only to simplify. By implication, the
immoral consumers who for the reasons of opportunism switch the ￿rm tend to
cause a positive externality on the moral ones. Such a positive externality tends,
however, to be diluted if the private return on signalling a moral characteristic
su⁄ers from the number of boycotters. Organizing a boycott, however, can be
socially costly as it represents a reduction in use of resources in a productive
activity. People who bear these costs may not be the same people who bene￿t
from boycotts as some are free-riders and can take opportunistically the advan-
tage of lower prices of the products boycotted. Those less moral individuals who
buy from the unethical ￿rm su⁄er a cost as they de￿nitively are now separated
from the moral ones.
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